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The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants have 
been widely considered as opportunities for the world to 
reconsider old approaches to refugee and migrant protec-
tion. The New York Declaration is global, not only because 
it emanates from a global institution, but also because of 
the following aspects, to be detailed in course of this article: 
First, a single declaration covering subjects of migration 
and forced migration is an acknowledgment of the reality 
that the two have deep relations, and that population flows 
are increasingly mixed and massive, defying neat catego-
rization. Second, the declaration also highlights the limits 
and/or unwillingness of states to carry primary respon-
sibility of refugees and migrants, and hence opens up the 
possibility to include the “whole of society,” which is to say 
the “whole of globe” covering stakeholders including busi-
ness and commercial segments. Third, the new approach is 
global because refugees and migrants are conceptualized 
as subjects of global development. Fourth, migration and 
refugee “crises” are considered inevitable, hence the need for 
durable solutions, such as the need for a globally relevant 
comprehensive response framework. And finally, the article 
touches on the changing nature of the rights question under 
such a technological mode of management. These aspects 
are not discussed separately in order, but in an interrelated 
way. The article is a post-colonial critique of an emerging 
global apparatus of care and power.
Résumé
Les Pactes Mondiaux pour les Réfugiés et les Migrants ont 
généralement été considérés comme des opportunités de 
repenser les vieilles approches concernant la protection 
des réfugiés et migrants. La Déclaration de New York est 
globale non seulement car elle émane d’une institution glo-
bale, mais aussi en raison des aspects suivants, qui seront 
détaillés dans cet article: Premièrement, une déclaration 
unique couvrant les sujets de la migration et de la migration 
forcée est une reconnaissance du fait que les deux ont une 
relation profonde et que les flux de population sont de plus 
en plus mixtes et massifs, défiant les catégorisations pures. 
Deuxièmement, la Déclaration souligne aussi les limites et/
ou la réticence des États à porter la responsabilité principale 
des réfugiés et migrants, et, de ce fait, ouvre la possibilité 
d’inclure toute la société, ce qui en revient à dire « le monde 
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entier » recouvrant diverses parties prenantes, dont les sec-
teurs des affaires et du commerce. Troisièmement, la nou-
velle approche est globale car les réfugiés et les migrants sont 
conceptualisés comme des sujets du développement global. 
Quatrièmement, les « crises » migratoires et des réfugiés sont 
considérées comme inévitables, et requérant par conséquent 
des solutions durables, telles qu’un cadre d’intervention glo-
bal et pertinent au niveau mondial. Finalement, cet article 
traite de la nature changeante de la question des droits sous 
un mode de gestion aussi technocratique. Ces aspects ne 
sont pas traités séparément, mais de manière interreliée. 
Cet article est une critique postcoloniale d’un appareil glo-
bal d’aide et de pouvoir en émergence.
The Birth of a Global Gaze
The Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Com-pact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, man-dated by the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, 2016, have been widely considered as opportuni-
ties for the world to reconsider old approaches to refugee 
and migrant protection. The declaration was unambiguous 
in linking the question of protecting the migrants and refu-
gees with a global development agenda.2 It was also a prom-
ise of a new orientation to a global issue. 
Annex 1 of the Compact on Refugees spoke of a compre-
hensive refugee response framework (which would include 
improved norms of reception and admission, support for 
immediate and ongoing needs, support for host countries 
and communities, and steps towards durable solutions) and 
the resolution invited the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to engage with states 
and consult all relevant stakeholders over the coming two 
years, with a view to evaluating the detailed practical appli-
cation of the comprehensive refugee response framework 
(CRRF) and assessing the scope for refinement and further 
development. It also specified that the objective was to ease 
pressures on the host countries involved, to enhance refugee 
self-reliance, to expand access to third country solutions, 
and to support conditions in countries of origin for return in 
safety and dignity. The UNHCR was asked to propose a global 
compact on refugees in the annual report of the High Com-
missioner to the General Assembly in 2018, for considera-
tion by the Assembly at its seventy-third session.
Annex II likewise proposed intergovernmental nego-
tiations leading to the adoption of a global compact for safe, 
orderly, and regular migration. It said that the proposed 
global compact would set out a range of principles, commit-
ments, and understandings among member states regarding 
international migration in all its dimensions, and thus make 
an important contribution to global governance and enhance 
coordination on international migration by dealing with all 
aspects of international migration, including the humanitar-
ian, developmental, human rights-related, and other aspects 
of migration. As set out in its draft “Vision and Guiding Prin-
ciples,” the Migration Compact decided to focus on some of 
the following objectives, to be fulfilled through actionable 
commitments: collection and utilization of accurate, disag-
gregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies;3 mini-
mization of the drivers and structural factors that compel 
people to leave their country of origin; provision of adequate 
and timely information at all stages of migration, and all 
migrants with proof of legal identity, proper identification 
and documentation; enhanced availability and flexibility of 
pathways for regular migration; fair and ethical recruitment 
and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work; address 
and reduce vulnerabilities in migration; manage borders in 
an integrated, secure, and coordinated manner; strengthen 
certainty and predictability in migration procedures; use 
migration detention only as a measure of last resort and 
work towards alternatives; enhance consular protection, 
assistance, and cooperation throughout the migration cycle; 
provide access to basic services for migrants; eliminate all 
forms of discrimination and promote fact-based public dis-
course to shape perceptions of migration and invest in skills 
development and facilitate recognition of skills, qualifica-
tions, and competences; create conditions for migrants and 
diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in 
all countries; promote faster, safer, and cheaper transfer of 
remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants; and 
establish mechanisms for the portability of social security 
entitlements and earned benefits.4
These two compacts together promised a new global 
approach to global migration, including forced migration. 
The slogan was to be “Making migration work for all.”
The declaration was global, not only because it emanated 
from a global institution, but also because of the following 
aspects to be detailed in the course of this article. 
First, a single declaration covering migration and forced 
migration was an acknowledgment of the reality that the two 
had deep relations, and that population flows were increas-
ingly mixed and massive, defying neat categorization. 
Second, the declaration also highlighted the limits and/
or unwillingness of states to carry primary responsibility for 
refugees and migrants, and hence opened up the possibility 
to include the “whole of society,” which is to say the “whole 
of globe” covering stakeholders including business and com-
mercial segments. 
Third, the declaration suggested uneven geographies of 
protection and labour market, and conceived of the globe in 
terms of sanctuaries, third countries, hotspots, border zones, 
safe corridors, legally run labour regimes, remittance-centric 
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segments of global economy, as well places characterized by 
multi-stakeholder operations. These geographies were cre-
ated in part by spatial planning for refugees and migrants, in 
part by financial and security operations. 
Fourth, the new approach was global because refugees 
and migrants were conceptualized as subjects of global 
development. 
Fifth, migration and refugee “crises” were going to be 
inevitable unless the world struggled for durable solu-
tions—hence the need for a globally relevant comprehensive 
response framework, such as the CRRF, and what the IOM 
popularized as a “framework for effective practices with 
regard to management capacity building.”5 
Finally, solutions could become durable only by becom-
ing global, first as indicated above by practising a new geog-
raphy of labour market and care, and second, by pursuing a 
technological mode of management that would circumvent 
borders and boundaries to cope with the complex reality of 
global migration.
In this background, this article focuses on the initiative 
for a global compact on refugees. The article aims to show 
how a global gaze as an apparatus of power is born, how it 
becomes a material reality, how a particular ideology, in this 
case humanitarianism, works as the vehicle of such a global 
machine, how the global must become technological in its 
strategy, and finally what happens to the agenda of rights, 
which had provided the backbone of much of the welfare 
and protection ethos in the preceding century. 
The Roadmap of a Global Plan
The UNDP spent nearly half a million dollars (USD) in 2017 
in supporting the migration compact process. This was 
overseen by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of the 
UNDP. Austria, Australia, Cyprus, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia, 
and Switzerland provided the money, with Norway putting 
up most of the support—USD257,748. This was only one of 
several indications of monetary and other investments to 
prepare consent for the global compact agenda and secure 
it. In this way, scores of funding agencies, countries, founda-
tions, think tanks, and multilateral institutions got involved 
in the process.6 Global conversations were initiated and held. 
Meetings were organized in the metropolises, mostly in the 
Global North and some in the Global South. The agenda of 
preparing the world for a new regime of protection as part 
of global governance was shaped through these steps. If this 
was only a picture of one organization (UNDP), one can only 
imagine the amount money, number of meetings, presence 
of specialists, recycling of views of known specialists, and 
involvement of a thin layer of experts of the South that were 
required to manufacture consent for the idea of a global 
mandate. Indeed these were marks of the process. By and 
large, human rights activists, peace activists, political parties, 
governments, regional associations, and critical jurists of the 
post-colonial world were left out.7 The global compact/s was/
were to become a reality in a short time. A detailed work 
plan was chalked out for “global compact for safe, orderly 
and regular migration,” with preparatory meetings to be held 
in three phases in New York, Geneva, and Vienna—three of 
the global capitals. Thematic sessions, UN regional economic 
commissions, regional consultations (discussions to be 
held in regional capital cities), multi-stakeholder meetings, 
global fora on migration and development, IOM-conducted 
international dialogue on migration, and other prepara-
tory stocktaking meetings, distribution of documents, and 
negotiations were steps towards building consensus on the 
compact.8
The UNHCR’s roadmap to a global compact on refugees 
proposed two complementary parts: a comprehensive refu-
gee response framework, as agreed to by states, and a pro-
gram of action setting out measures to be taken by states and 
other relevant stakeholders, to underpin the CRRF, support 
its application, and ultimately ensure more equitable shar-
ing of the responsibility for responding to large movements 
of refugees. The process would take special note of (1) the 
application of the CRRF in specific countries and situations; 
(2) a series of five thematic discussions, held in the second 
half of 2017; and (3) a stocktaking of progress made and 
lessons learned—which would identify good practices in 
refugee responses, actions that were required to bring about 
the type of response envisaged in the New York Declaration, 
and areas for future development.9 It was also specifically 
mentioned that the path of the compact would be marked by 
a multi-stakeholder, “whole-of-society” approach endorsed 
by the General Assembly in the New York Declaration that 
would involve “national and local authorities, international 
organizations, international financial institutions, regional 
organizations, regional coordination and partnership 
mechanisms, civil society partners, including faith-based 
organizations and academia, the private sector, media and 
the refugees themselves.”10 
The UNHCR was thus ambitious. Usually nations have 
compacts on war, peace, cessation of hostilities, develop-
ment projects, regional trade, etc. Now the UNHCR was 
embarking on achieving a compact on human beings—a 
group of human beings.11 It was upheld as a political dec-
laration (paragraph 1); member states were to reaffirm their 
commitments to migrants and refugees, and the UNHCR 
declared the need for “a framework for a comprehensive and 
people-centric refugee response to each situation involving 
large number of refugees” (paragraph 4).
What were to be the main aspects of this framework? It 
was to have four objectives: to (1) ease pressures on host 
Volume 36 Refuge Number 1
78
countries; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand 
access to third-country solutions; and (4) support conditions 
in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. We can 
only note here that “easing pressure on host countries” indi-
rectly alluded to countries of the North and not South (say 
Pakistan or Bangladesh); enhancing refugee self-reliance has 
implied increasing dependence on the market; expanding 
access to third-country solutions has meant shifting more 
burdens to countries of the South; and returning refugees 
has often been “forced return,” as in the ongoing case of the 
Rohingyas. These were time-worn policies, whose advocates 
never tired of repeating them, whose results had never been 
objectively analyzed, and that now came back under the call 
for a comprehensive refugee response framework, whose 
key pillars were equally time-worn: reception and admission 
(thus they may be interned in camps and detention centres), 
support for immediate and ongoing needs (thus barely mini-
mal), support for host countries and communities; and that 
old pillar of protection called “durable solutions.”12
Added to that was the advocacy of a multi-stakeholder, 
“whole-of-society” approach that included national and 
local authorities, international organizations, international 
financial institutions, regional organizations, regional coor-
dination and partnership mechanisms, civil society partners, 
including faith-based organizations and academia, the pri-
vate sector, media, and the refugees themselves. The whole-
of-society approach thus bypassed considering the existing 
variety of protection modes in the vast post-colonial world, 
and took a “modernistic” and global governance approach, 
which would focus on identifying or detecting an “emer-
gency.” Thus the “whole-of-society” approach advocated 
“more sustainable refugee responses by linking humanitarian 
and development efforts early on in a crisis, and by strength-
ening sustainable approaches that invest in the resilience of 
both refugees and local communities, including through 
investment in national and local systems wherever possible.”13 
It also meant understanding migration risk and resilience in 
disasters.14
The global nature of the refugee response was acknowl-
edged in this way. It meant two things.
First, it meant a comprehensive response built around 
“emergencies,” an indirect acknowledgment that migrations 
were becoming mixed and massive, and displacements were 
increasingly protracted,15 with refugees and migrants in 
limbo. Yet the “emergency” was never defined. What defined 
an emergency—the capacity of a host country, or number 
of escapees, or the complex of factors contributing to an 
intolerable situation of not only escape but also arrival (say 
in Calais or Idomeni) or even the nature of passage (say 
through a sea), or the refusal of a state like Australia to allow 
the asylum-seeking escapees to arrive—even sinking rickety 
boats on the sea and confining them to islands away from 
human eyes—indeed what constituted an emergency? What 
would justify global attention?
Second, it called for widening the protection capacity 
through a whole-of-society approach, which again was an 
admission that states were not marshalling their protec-
tion capacity adequately—some were, while many were not. 
Therefore societies were to be mobilized widely and deeply. 
This could mean putting more stress on countries already 
reeling under the burden of protecting and caring, while 
others would not share the burden at all, or share less. In 
other words, the whole of society was again a global gaze 
that would not take into account variegated approaches and 
experiences of care and protection, such as cities of refuge, 
bilateral treaties and other arrangements, regional initiatives, 
local innovations, and steps to keep the borders relatively 
open so that refugees could come in, work, and go back in 
an irregular manner—approaches that made stay more flex-
ible. From the beginning, the whole-of-society approach was 
a captive of the myth of durable solutions, which had given 
birth to the UNHCR in the first place.
It was necessary to mobilize the whole of society because 
other desperate attempts at durable solutions had failed, and 
in the context of the Mediterranean crisis and the European 
migration crisis something had to done. Economy buttressed 
by demography has been always the other scene of refugee 
and migration management in the modern capitalist age. Yet 
this could hardly be acknowledged. Humanitarianism was 
the ground on which the new migration and refugee manage-
ment mode was to be legitimized. The whole-of-society mode 
of management would enable refugees and migrants to learn 
quickly new skills, adapt themselves relatively quickly—in a 
year or two—to new requirements of language, labour proto-
cols, and self-run business rules, and learn to straddle the two 
different but interacting worlds of the formal economy and 
the informal economy. The eventual absorption of current 
immigrant flows of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour 
in labour markets of Europe and countries of other regions 
(Brazil, South Africa, Hong Kong, the Gulf states, etc.), albeit 
in differential manner, would not be substantially different 
from what had happened in Europe, the United States, Can-
ada, and Australia in the pre–Second World War years.16 In 
a dense labour market scenario, “whole of society” (involve-
ment of all “stakeholders”) meant pleas for labour market 
equality. But formal (political, legal) equality made sense only 
if they were relevant for entry in labour markets. Otherwise 
as a labouring subject, the migrant’s lack of political equality 
was the other side of her economic ability to enter the labour 
market. For a long time, it was a case of political opportunity 
but economic closure; now it was a case of economic opening 
(entry in the informal labour market) but political closure. In 
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a way this return of economy to the centre stage of discussions 
on refugees and migrants was strange but perhaps should not 
have been considered so, if we recall that at the heart of the 
“durable solutions” debate in refugee studies circles, the issue 
of economic rehabilitation was always paramount. The for-
mation of the UNHCR itself, nudged by the UN Economic and 
Social Council, was an effort to find a durable solution to the 
refugee crisis.
In short, the roadmap avoided the political question of 
economy, and thus the issue of financial responsibility—
responsibility of global powers for unleashing wars and caus-
ing population displacements, responsibility of countries 
for embarking on citizenship drives, making many people 
stateless and turning them into wandering hordes of protec-
tionless subjects—as well as the responsibility of the institu-
tions of global governance to ensure an equitable sharing of 
burden. While there were ample references to the principle 
of responsibility, it avoided the issue of reparations—which 
was at the heart of the issue of burden and the shift from 
the idea of burden to that of responsibility—for wars and 
destruction of economies leading to massive migrations. 
This is the post-colonial wedge running through the world 
of global humanitarianism.
But perhaps the biggest paradox of this new global plan 
was that it treated a massive block of the world population as 
a subject of a compact as if it was a piece of land, a sea, a min-
eral-rich territory, etc., and avoided the question of rights. 
But again is this not how minorities were traded as subjects 
of international diplomacy since the “bad” Ottoman days? 
Migrants and refugees had few rights, or none at all; there 
was to be no charter of rights of refugees and migrants. They 
were to be subjects of care, and hence international subjects. 
Thus, to be humanitarian one had to be global. 
The Arendtian impasse was resolved in this way. Hanna 
Arendt had raised the reality of refugees as subjects of a basic 
“rightlessness.” Neoliberalism resolved the problematic of a 
neologism. One cannot be a subject of “rightlessness”—in 
such a condition one would not be a subject at all. Neoliberal-
ism has rescued the refugee as a subject—subject of economy, 
subject of care of the whole of society, a subject for whom 
politics is redundant. Rights no longer make a subject; care 
does, economy does, global attention does. 
The Humanitarian Machine
Yet at this point we must note that in this roadmap, in which 
consultation was given due bureaucratic place, human rights 
or civil rights bodies within countries were shunned. In 
place were given a set of dates for six consultations between 
February and July 2018, to be co-chaired by a member of the 
UNHCR’s Executive Committee Bureau, together with the 
UNHCR’s assistant high commissioner for protection, and 
to be held in private at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. A 
zero draft of the compact was shared with states and other 
relevant stakeholders by the end of January 2018. Following 
the formal consultation, the UNHCR shared a revised draft 
of the global compact, and the expected outcome at the end 
of the formal consultations would be a non-binding docu-
ment, reflecting a consensus among all UN member states. 
All member and non-member observer states of the United 
Nations, and non-governmental organizations having 
consultative status with the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council or were members of the International Coun-
cil of Voluntary Agencies, were invited to participate in the 
formal consultations.17 Meanwhile do-gooder intellectuals 
were to be encouraged to send written contributions to the 
process. Evidently, the figure of the rights-bearing migrant 
or the refugee was to be only a skeleton in this policy feast 
at Geneva. The humanitarian machine was given a new life 
in this way.
One telling instance of the machine being reset to work 
was the step to set up another bureaucratic body—an Asylum 
Capacity Support Group—by the UNHCR under the heading 
“Identifying International Protection Needs,” as if inadequate 
asylum-determining capacity was the reason behind states’ 
(read states of the North) reluctance to take in the asylum-
seeking population. The Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework, mentioned earlier, was the keystone of the 
global-humanitarian machine. As with all other machines, 
it needed to be fed and lubricated, and in this case bodies 
were needed for the job. Marx spoke of human bodies and 
the machine in a factory. Here the bodies for the humani-
tarian machine were the poor states of the South, and not 
the reluctant countries of the North. The UNHCR declared 
that the CRRF was being applied in thirteen countries and 
situations: Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mex-
ico, and Panama (who had come together under a regional 
approach, the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solu-
tions Framework) and in Africa, seven countries—Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Somalia, and Zambia. The UNHCR further declared that 
the “range of situations” included “regional diversity and a 
variety of phases (new emergency, established situation, pro-
tracted situation).” The UNHCR also expressed satisfaction 
that important work on many of the elements of CRRF was 
already underway in many other contexts, such as preven-
tion and response to sexual and gender-based violence, or 
innovation in the delivery of assistance, such as cash-based 
interventions. It felt that the “process of assessment and 
refinement [was] key to the development of the global com-
pact on refugees.”18
The machinic nature of the CRRF also devoured the spirit of 
the cities. The movement, “cities of refuge,” was turned into a 
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bureaucratic appendage of a gigantic machine. Pioneered by 
the Rockefeller Foundation, 100 “resilient cities” were lined 
up.19 Urban resilience was defined as the capacity of indi-
viduals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems 
within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter what 
kinds of “chronic stresses and acute shocks” they experience. 
“Chronic stresses” weakened the fabric of a city on a daily 
or cyclical basis, and such stresses included high unemploy-
ment, inefficient public transportation systems, endemic vio-
lence, and chronic food and water shortages. “Acute shocks” 
such as earthquakes, floods, disease outbreaks, and terrorist 
attacks were sudden and sharp events that threatened a city. 
And of course cities were doing what they could, not because 
their national governments had directed them to do so, but 
often against national governments or independent of these 
governments, cities provided hospitality, and these stories of 
hospitality were marked invariably with conflicts and con-
tentions. The ghosts of cities like Kolkata, Karachi, Bangkok, 
Nairobi, Istanbul, Johannesburg, and Mumbai had effected 
the mythical transformation of the urban landscape into one 
of kindness.20 There was an accompanying transformation—
that of a movement inspired by thinkers like Derrida, Edward 
Said, Bourdieu, and others into another potential cog in the 
humanitarian machine.21 Rights and justice were alien cries 
in this world of humanitarian machines. The radical edge of 
the idea of “cities of refuge” had rested on acknowledgment 
that urban spaces were marked with the materiality of con-
trol and contests, and that space for migrants and refugees 
had not been given benevolently by city fathers and mothers, 
but that it was an outcome of the sheer persistent presence 
of the migrant in the city. The governmentalization of the 
movement attempted to take away that radical edge.
How did this governmentalization of a noble idea come 
about? To understand that, we must first take a look at the 
enormous range of inputs from institutions to the framing 
of the “zero draft” (at the heart of which sat the policy of a 
comprehensive framework). Just as a big factory works like 
an assembly of machinic inputs, here too an assembly pro-
cess could be found at work—from the Council of Europe, 
the European Union, and the European Asylum Support 
Office, to institutions like the Arab Regional Consultative 
Process on Migration and Refugee Affairs, the Vaccine Alli-
ance, Global Youth Advisory Council, ICRC, Human Rights 
Council, International Labour Organisation, the UN Broad-
band Commission for Sustainable Development, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural 
Development and the World Food Programme, International 
Organisation for Migration, Inter Parliamentary Union), UN 
Women, World Bank, UNICEF, United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, World 
Food Programme, UNDP, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Habitat, Metropolis, 
WHO, Asylum Access, and several other international non-
governmental organizations, and the International Refugee 
Congress. In addition, consider the hundreds of statements 
and inputs from the governments. The IRC spoke of itself 
as “We, 156 participants, representing 98 diverse institutions 
from 29 countries, including refugee led and host community 
civil society organisations and initiatives, academia, think 
tanks, municipalities and the private sector came together in 
Istanbul for the International Refugee Congress on May 10–11, 
2018. The gathering in Istanbul drew on the contributions of 
close to 600 organizations from 47 countries, which partici-
pated in consultations that were held over the past six months 
leading to the Congress.”22 “This preparation process and the 
meeting itself provided an important platform to demonstrate 
our shared quest for equal participation in decision making 
processes at all levels, as well as our common commitment 
to work together to put the voices and aspirations of refugees 
and host communities at the forefront of policy and program 
development, including the Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR).”23 To be fair, the GCR spoke of rights, but as expected 
was minimal in its approach.
There was a pattern to global consultations preceding the 
drafting of the compact. Most input providers, as evident 
from the random list of names given above, were “inter-
national,” the forums were “international,” and UN institu-
tions had been ploughed in—as if in an orchestrated chorus 
of voices in support for the need a new global compact. If 
they chose, the UNHCR and other UN institutions could have 
used their country offices throughout the world to act as 
catalysts for intra-country and intra-regional discussions 
on what should go into a compact or what else should have 
been striven for towards a new global initiative, or if a new 
global compact was needed at all. In South Asia, the UNHCR 
took no such initiative; in India, none. In India, there was 
no discussion with rights groups, political movements, refu-
gee advocacy platforms, scholars and their bodies, not even 
any discussion with humanitarian institutions providing 
aid and relief to the shelter-seekers. And particularly the 
process avoided drawing any lesson from the vast corpus of 
experiences from the management of fallouts from internal 
displacements. 
Thus, it was a case of the “global plan” choosing to be 
global. The global was only self-reproducing, though from 
some communiqués, statements, manifestos, declarations, 
and representations it seemed as if the muffled voice of rights 
of the victims of forced migration was trying to break out. 
However, it was a weak voice that could not question the for-
mulation of the principle of responsibility on which the real-
ization of rights rested. The “responsibility to protect” prin-
ciple had empowered and legitimized interventions while 
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remaining silent about any responsibility for wars, denial of 
asylums, structural adjustment programs, policies of meta-
borders, and regime change campaigns that had provoked 
the current phase of refugee and forced migration flows. 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) had reserved all powers 
for the major countries of the world and the institutions of 
global governance, and had tasked the hapless UN agencies 
with “humanitarian” responsibility.24 Now when the R2P had 
backfired, the global consultation process remained silent on 
the complicity of the global governance regime busy with 
humanitarian tasks. It was clearly an act of bad faith. One 
may ask why the question of R2P suddenly vanished from 
the global protection agenda. Or was it now to be invoked 
only selectively so that it could no longer be formulated as a 
major component of the principle of responsibility?
The figure of the refugee and the migrant was thus up 
against two realities—the reality of sovereignty and the real-
ity of a global economy, which could think of the refugee 
only as cheap labour employed in informal economies and 
supply chains. In this bleak backdrop of dissociation of 
power and responsibility, as if in a last burst of humanitarian 
emotion the UNICEF cried out, “This is the moment for States 
to ensure that the provisions of the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child are fully realised for all children, especially those 
most at risk through no fault of their own.”25
The Global Gaze is a Technocratic Gaze
Till now this article has shown how, in producing a global 
gaze, the roadmap was as important as the task of redefin-
ing and reproducing humanitarianism. However, there 
was another factor, which related to the need to develop a 
technocratic gaze that could make care global. Continuous 
improvements in successive drafts on detailing technocratic 
means and modes to refugee protection were signs of the 
evolution of such a technocratic gaze. Also, this technologic 
gaze was natural, given that political voices had been silenced 
from the beginning, the diversity of experiences had been 
ignored, human rights had been replaced by humanitarian-
ism, the place of claims and justice had been given over to 
pity, kindness, and compassion, and the principle of plural 
dialogues, decentralization, and international legal plural-
ism for the task of protection had been replaced by techno-
cratic modalities and the central mode of salvation. If in the 
nineteenth century humanitarianism had been about saving 
the damned souls, and in the twentieth century about saving 
damned bodies, in the neoliberal twenty-first century it was 
going to be about finding and refining technocratic, market-
based, digitally enabled modes of saving the damned world 
from humanitarian disasters. It was an apt signature of the 
age of the Anthropocene. The problem now was not about 
rescuing the soul or the body, but about the right mode and 
the right instrument to be resilient in face of disasters. In this 
technocratic turn, which was clearly away from the earlier 
dominantly legal turn in humanitarianism in the post-1951 
time, getting the right platform and the right protocol for 
saving the world got the place of honour now.
One consequence of the technocratic turn was that poli-
tics was even more effaced from the refugee and migrant 
question. Let us take the example of race. There was only 
one reference to the word race in the final draft of the Global 
Compact (that too, a customary reference).26 The deploy-
ment of the word was in the same context as in the first draft 
(paragraph 12), second draft (paragraph 10), and third draft 
(paragraph 9).27 This singular reference in each of the three 
drafts, and same in nature, was in the context of non-discrim-
ination only. The makers of the drafts never realized in their 
technocratic obsession that race was a pillar of the structure 
of forced migration. It was the same with another keyword, 
religion. Again the word is to be found in the same paragraph 
and context in the final draft and the three previous drafts. 
It was a stunning near-omission in the background of the 
global discourse on terror, which had used race and religion 
(often mixing them) to unleash wars on countries and peo-
ples, and used counter-terrorism logic to deny refugees and 
other victims of forced migration protection, and immigrant 
labour their rights. On the other hand, the draft was almost 
legitimizing the discourse on terror that denies the rights of 
refugees and other victims by saying, as in the second draft, 
“Security considerations and international protection are 
complementary. The primary responsibility for safety and 
security lies with States which can benefit from the promo-
tion of national integrated approaches that protect refugees 
and their human rights, while safeguarding national security, 
including from a counter-terrorism perspective. The legiti-
mate security concerns of host States are fully recognized, 
as well as the need to uphold the civilian and humanitarian 
character of asylum.”28 The final draft stepped back from the 
political blunder and reformulated the point under the head-
ing “Safety and Security”: 
Security considerations and international protection are comple-
mentary. The primary responsibility for safety and security lies with 
States, which can benefit from the promotion of national integrated 
approaches that protect refugees and their human rights, while safe-
guarding national security. The legitimate security concerns of host 
States are fully recognized, as well as the importance of upholding 
the civilian and humanitarian character of international protection 
and applicable international law, both in emergency and protracted 
situations. At the request of concerned States, and in full respect of 
national laws and policies, UNHCR and relevant stakeholders will 
contribute resources and expertise to support protection-sensitive 
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arrangements for timely security screening and health assessments 
of new arrivals. (paras 56–7)
Yet precisely on these grounds of security, health screen-
ing, “identification and separation of fighters and combat-
ants at border entry points or as early as possible after arrival,” 
and “legitimate security concerns of host States,” the rights 
of refugees have been denied. Not incidentally, these are the 
marks of the fundamental phenomenological principle of 
race. The refugee is the carrier of race, and this is one of the 
ways in which migration today appears as “crisis.” If blood in 
the not so ancient time determined race, religion today often 
acts as a determinant of race. The entire refugee protection 
regime from its inception has been guilty of maintaining 
silence over race as a fundamental fault line in the structure 
of population flows, and hence has never noticed how rac-
ism has transformed to create newer and newer forms of 
boundaries that migrants and refugees would have to per-
petually cross to reach the never finally reachable destina-
tions of “safety and security”—the two words of concern of 
the Global Compact. The colour of the skin has been supple-
mented by the colour of religion today, and this became more 
than evident in the first full-scale race war of the neoliberal 
age—the Balkan wars. Technocratic solutions—such as set-
ting up a global refugee forum, support platforms, a multi-
stakeholder and partnership approach, early warning system, 
preparedness and contingency planning, improvement of 
immediate reception arrangements for refugees, safety and 
security measures, improved procedures of registration and 
documentation, procedures for voluntary repatriation, reset-
tlement, and complementary pathways for admission to third 
countries, modes of local integration along with other local 
solutions, intensive data collection and management, and 
finally better social care such as education, health, accom-
modation, energy needs, resource management, nutrition, 
etc.29—cannot change the facts where refugees live, say in 
Idomeni, Chittagong, Calais, or Darfur, or the way refugees 
and migrants are received and detained or turned back at the 
borders of the metropolitan world. These technocratic solu-
tions attempt to resituate in concrete terms the historical dis-
courses of humanitarianism from which the administrative 
modes of governance have emerged.30 They introduce into 
our contemporary neoliberal time the infamous figure of an 
alien, someone belonging to an alien race and embodying 
the historical facts of invasion, appropriation of lands, and 
the enslavement of men, women, and children. Technocratic 
solutions based on global humanitarianism filter the most 
vigorous and absolute fact of claims and will allow no aspect 
of the barbarian into history.
The task therefore is to locate concretely the secret rela-
tion between the ideology of humanitarianism, universalism, 
and the power of technological mode of care. The question 
will be, How could humanitarianism that naturally essays 
into universalism become dependent on global technologi-
cal power?
In this age when the range of humanitarianism extends 
from humanitarian bombings to humanitarian protection, 
responsibility and burden sharing in order to be effective has 
to acquire technical solutions, such as mode and determina-
tion of the quantum of monetary support to host countries 
and communities, providing political, material, and tech-
nical resources, help to prepare countries and agencies for 
large movements of refugees and to provide refugee protec-
tion; expanding access to third-country solutions, includ-
ing resettlement and complementary pathways,31 such as 
regional mobility schemes, support to emerging resettlement 
countries, and identifying and involving relevant stakehold-
ers according to their respective capacity—all these so that 
“burden” sharing becomes “responsibility” sharing.
In this way, the new humanitarian tools can ensure 
that refugees will be no longer considered a burden but a 
responsibility of the society.32 This has been at the heart of 
the crucial strategy of the CRRF, which we have discussed 
earlier, and which means a globally coordinated policy that 
involves mobilizing greater resources through innovative 
approaches, ensuring humanitarian assistance through local 
systems, education to build on sustainable development 
goals, concrete support for national health systems, energy 
and environment protection, and strengthening economic 
opportunities for refugees and members of local communi-
ties through structural analysis of and support to local labour 
markets and access by refugees to financial products and ser-
vices. The CRRF echoes the sustainable development goals of 
development.33 This is maximum humanitarianism—when 
humanitarianism removes the opprobrium of “refugees as 
burden” and reorients the task of protection as “refugees 
as subjects of development.” This is the way in which the 
global presence of the postcolonial in the forced migration 
scenario is addressed. With arrival of the global principle of 
responsibility, refugees and migrants are encouraged to learn 
to live on till development arrives. They must not clamour 
for rights. They must not disturb any system put in place for 
“safe and orderly migration.”
Yet if we have to conceptualize rights as the scene of poli-
tics whose displaced image we find only in the humanitarian 
mechanisms, we must, while ending this article, look care-
fully, albeit briefly, into the fate of the rights agenda in the 
neoliberal age.
Rights under a Global Regime of Care and Power 
Even though it can be claimed that the 1951 Convention is 
a rights-based document, the convention does not contain 
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a charter of refugee rights or suggestion about the formu-
lation of any such charter. The convention also cannot be 
considered as a manifesto of rights of migrants and refugees. 
It primarily enjoins certain obligations on states to refu-
gees and asylum seekers from which international law and 
municipal laws the world over have tried to deduce refugee 
rights. Rights of the refugees in such situations become, as 
has happened, a matter of jurisprudence, a continuous tus-
sle between legal and human rights activists and the states, 
and protection has become a matter of following legal norms 
and certain protocols. In situations like the European migra-
tion “crisis,” refugee rights became an anachronism. Such a 
situation shows on one hand the ever increasing demand 
on humanitarian alertness and response and on the other 
hand the ineffectiveness of the half-hearted approach of a 
global body such as the UNHCR to the issue of rights. Yet as 
the overwhelming presence of the humanitarian approach 
reaches a point of emptying it of all humanitarian content, 
the rights question creeps back to the political question of 
migration in contemporary global history. 
In this situation, the notion of rights becomes subordi-
nate to the power to protect, and care becomes a part of pro-
tection. Refugees are then less rights-bearing subjects, and 
more dispossessed victims to be protected and thus cared 
for. Care and protection in the form of a migration manage-
ment mode form the dominant reality. Hence, improvement 
of management modes gets pride of place in the strategy laid 
out by the compact. In the wake of the so-called migration 
crisis, to the extent there is a return of rights to the discourse 
of a global compact, it is thus due not to law, but to the persis-
tence of massive and mixed migratory flows, whose unruly 
nature nullifies the well laid out plans for safe and orderly 
migration. These flows continuously pound on the walls of 
the protected states and regions. They are evidence of what 
some thinkers call the “autonomy of migration.” Flows of 
people are unrestricted by laws, procedures, and controls; 
and they defy the refugee regime, not because the victims of 
forced migration are unruly subjects of international law, but 
because these flows are mixed. They do not belong to one 
pure type and they are massive.34 Also the displacements 
are increasingly protracted. The inherently subversive and 
oppositional nature of migration expressed in acts of free-
dom has been the greatest worry for the refugee regime, and 
the reactive nature of the migratory flows as resistance to 
control practices is also matched by the fact that the refugee 
and migrant resistance anticipates many of the control meas-
ures. Thus, as some have suggested, “the relation between 
control and escape is one of temporal difference: escape 
comes first.”35 Or one can say that the migrant autonomy 
is already “entangled in and regulated by control.”36 Well-
considered policies and measures meet migration practices 
as an adversary; each anticipates the other, and the result 
is an the enormous difficulty of making migration orderly 
and regulated.37 Claims to justice have emerged in this situ-
ation. In a milieu marked by the autonomy of population 
movements, these claims now confront the humanitarian 
order. They create a new politics of rights, different from 
the ones recognized reluctantly in the Convention of 1951 
or the balancing acts of the UNHCR and the IOM. In the post– 
Second World War era, rights were connected with welfare 
and a regime of Keynesianism. Now they are linked to a 
global neoliberal regime of protection, which subsumes the 
former and with it the notion of care.
It is thus a contradictory situation.38 The dissociation of 
law and claims forms the context in which the rights politics 
reorients itself; and the GCR occupies an awkward position 
in this confrontation between a regulatory mode of humani-
tarianism and the autonomous claim to move and secure 
justice. Building on humanitarian principles and a global 
ambition to do well for the world, the GCR cannot venture 
into the other scene—the scene of unregulated flows, claims 
to autonomy and rights as the form of justice or claim to 
citizenship in conditions of statelessness, customary and 
local modes of protection, legal pluralism, scores of bilateral 
treaties to save refugees, older histories of protection in the 
great decades of decolonization, and the variegated histories 
of care and reconciliation. Hence the humanitarian prom-
ises appear to be limited. That is the paradox. The paradox 
cannot be solved with globalization of protection strategy, 
inclusion of business houses to broaden the capacity base for 
protection, privatization of care, and fine tuning strategies 
and policies.
Indeed, one may ask, if these were the answers, what was 
the question? Why did we need the compacts in the first 
place? 
Notes
 1 The arguments are discussed in greater detail in the 
author’s  The Postcolonial Age of Migration  (Routledge, 
forthcoming).
 2 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration for Refu-
gees and Migrants,” September 19, 2016, para. 4, pp. 1–2, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/71/1.
 3 It never occurred to the IOM that data collection can be 
counter-productive for a large section of migrants. See, for 
instance, Frank Laczko of the IOM Global Migration Data 
Analysis Centre, “Improving Data on International Migra-
tion: Towards Agenda 2030 and the Global Compact on 
Migration,” IOM discussion paper, December 2016, https://
gmdac.iom.int/sites/default/files/presentations/Laczko.
pdf; also Migration Data Portal, “GCM Development 
Volume 36 Refuge Number 1
84
Process,” last modified August 20, 2019, https://migration-
dataportal.org/themes/global-compact-migration.
 4 USNW Sydney, “The Global Compacts on Refugees and 
Migration,” January 23, 2019, http://www.kaldorcentre.
unsw.edu.au/publication/2018-global-compacts-refugees-
and-migration.
 5 IOM, “Berne Initiative,” 2020, https://www.iom.int/
berne-initiative.
 6 UNDP, “Migration Compact Support MPTF: Financial 
Reporting on Sources and Uses of Funds for the Period 
Ending 31 December 2017,” 2018.
 7 Although we cannot give an exact figure on how many 
such persons were invited to such discussions hosted by 
the UNHCR or the IOM, India can be taken as an instance. 
See p. 11.
 8 September 20, 2017, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/
default/files/work_plan_gcm.pdf, 2.
 9 For further information, see UNHCR, “New York Declara-
tion for Refugees and Migrants,” www.unhcr.org/newyo-
rkdeclaration. The roadmap and other background infor-
mation is available at UNHCR, “The Global Compact on 
Refugees,” www.unhcr.org/refugeecompact.
 10 UNHCR, “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.” 
However, it is to be noted that the invocation of “society” to 
protect migrants and refugees meant that human rights and 
humanitarian activists, who are part of the “whole of soci-
ety,’’ could be “at war” with another side of the same society: 
officials and policy-makers. Humanitarianism was thus not 
just legitimized, it also became a site of contestation. 
 11 UNHCR, “Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: A 
Roadmap,” May 17, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/events/
conferences/58e625aa7/towards-global-compact-refugees-
roadmap.html.
 12 UNHCR, “Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: Key ele-
ments of the Roadmap,” May 17, 2017, http://www.unhcr.
org/58d135517.pdf.
 13 UNHCR, “Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: A Road-
map”; the concept of resilience played a big part in the 
framework of the compact on migration, and resilience 
needed technical means to build up. Thus, the IOM study 
paper “Migration, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of 
Sudden and Slow-Onset Disaster” rolled out the techni-
cal road to build migrants’ resilience. https://www.iom.
int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-
Paper-Migration-Risk-and-Resilience-in-the-Context.pdf. 
 14 UNHCR, “Migration, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of 
Sudden and Slow-Onset Disaster,” 3.
 15 Jessica Brandt and Lucy Earle commented in “The Global 
Compact for Refugees: Bringing Mayors to the Table,” 
Brookings Policy Brief, January 2018, “Displacement is 
increasingly protracted. Today, those who take flight are 
more likely than ever before to remain in exile for extended 
periods. At the end of last year, more than two-thirds of 
all refugees, some 11 million of them, were in a protracted 
refugee situation—one in which 25,000 or more refugees 
of the same nationality have been in exile for at least five 
consecutive years, with no immediate prospect of finding a 
durable solution.” Figures based on UNHCR, Global Trends: 
Forced Displacement in 2016 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/594aa38e0.html.
 16 Stephen Castles discussed the role of immigrant labour 
in Nazi Germany and postwar France, where immigrant 
workers accounted for at least 15 per cent of the workforce. 
See David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos, eds., A Com-
panion to Racial and Ethnic Studies  (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2002), 571–2.
 17 UNHCR, “Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: Road-
map on the Formal Consultations Process,” April 16, 2018, 
http://www.unhcr.org/5a60b9409.pdf.
 18 All citations in this paragraph are from UNHCR, “Bringing 
the New York Declaration to Life: Applying the Compre-
hensive Refugee Response Framework (crrf),” June 2017, 
http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
27/2017/07/BringingTheNewYorkDeclarationToLife.pdf.
 19 100 Resilient Cities, “Global Migration: Resilient Cities 
at the Forefront,” 2017, http://www.100resilientcities.org/
turning-migration-challenges-into-opportunities-to-
build-resilience/.
 20 On the histories of three well-known of post-colonial cities 
(Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi) marked with massive migrant 
presence, see R. Samaddar (ed.), Migrant and the Neoliberal 
City (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2018).
 21 Costas Douzinas, “Cities of Refuge,” openDemocracy, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/
costas-douzinas/cities-of-refuge; Jonathan Mark Darling, 
“Cities of Refuge: Asylum and the Politics of Hospital-
ity” (PhD diss., Durham University, 2008) http://etheses.
dur.ac.uk/2228/1/2228_238.pdf; J. Derrida, On Cosmopoli-
tanism and Forgiveness, trans. M. Dooley and M Hughes. 
(London: Routledge, 2001); also on cities becoming places 
of refuge, Jessica Brandt and Lucy Earle, “The Global Com-
pact for Refugees: Bringing Mayors to the Table,” Brook-
ings Policy Brief, January 2018.
 22 In preparation for a compact on safe, orderly, and regu-
lar migration, several institutions were likewise involved. 
However, in both cases, primarily global institutions were 
thinking globally, and where countries were involved, 
mostly ambassadors were involved in the discussions. 
Besides, there were regional meetings where prominent 
NGOs were involved. All were steps towards an intergov-
ernmental conference to adopt the global compact—UN 
General Assembly Resolution at the 72nd session, Sep-
tember 24, 2017. Indeed the resolution (72/244) went on to 
extreme procedural details to make the conference for the 
adoption of the compact possible: UN General Assembly, 
“Modalities for the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt 
the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion,” December 24, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/244.
Volume 36 Refuge Number  1
85
 23 International Refugee Congress, “Shared Responsibil-




 24 There is a voluminous literature on the “Responsibility 
to Protect.” On some of the reports, ICISS, Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty, December 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.
org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; e-International Relations, “The 
Responsibility to Protect,” November 2011, https://www.
files.ethz.ch/isn/181082/R2P.pdf.
 25 UNICEF, “The Time for Action Children Uprooted Is Now,” 
June 8, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/5a4374d47.pdf.
 26 UNHCR, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Final Draft,” 
June 26, 2018, para. 9, http://www.unhcr.org/5b3295167.pdf. 
 27 UNHCR, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 1,” March 
9, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/5aa2b3287.pdf; UNHCR, “The 
Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 2,” April 30, 2018, http://
www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5ae758d07/official-
version-draft-2-global-compact-refugees-30-april-2018.
html; and UNHCR, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Draft 
3,” June 4, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/ 
5b1579427/official-version-draft-3-global-compact- 
refugees-4-june-2018.html.
 28 Second draft, para. 59, p. 12.
 29 Changes in the successive drafts are instructive. For fine 
changes with regard to solutions, see UNHCR, “Global 
Compact on Refugees: From Draft 2 (30 April) to Draft 3 
(4 June): Explanatory Memorandum on Main Changes,” 
http://www.unhcr.org/5b1579b17.pdf. 
 30 The IOM vision statement explicitly accords importance to 
a proper governance framework to realize safe and orderly 
migration. See IOM, “IOM Vision on the Global Compact 
on Migration,” April 13, 2017, paras. 6–10, https://www.iom.
int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-vision-on-
the-global-compact-on-migration-13April2017.pdf.
 31 The technical nature of the idea of “complementary path-
ways” will be clear from the way the concept paper for 
thematic discussion IV (measures to be taken in pursuit of 
solutions) and thematic discussion V (issues that cut across 
all four substantive sections of the comprehensive refugee 
responses, and overarching issues) in the discussion on 
“Towards a Global Compact on Refugees,” Palais des Nations 
(room XIX), Geneva, November 14–15, 2017, formulated the 
following: “As a complement to resettlement opportunities, 
safe and regulated pathways for the admission of refugees 
to third countries can facilitate access to protection and 
solutions, and are an important expression of burden- and 
responsibility-sharing. In line with the commitments con-
tained in the New York Declaration,15 this panel will con-
sider ways that the programme of action can support the 
establishment or expansion of complementary pathways 
as part of a comprehensive refugee response, including by: 
(i) expanding family reunification; (ii) leveraging private 
and community sponsorship; (iii) increasing access to edu-
cational opportunities in third countries; (iv) facilitating 
labour mobility schemes; and (v) data collection on and 
overall monitoring of complementary pathways for admis-
sion.” http://www.unhcr.org/5a0019467.pdf.
 32 To make sense of the technical evolution, one should study 
the UN Refugee High Commissioner’s Annual Dialogues. 
For instance, these points of emphasis were laid out in 
UNHCR, “High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection 
Challenges, 2017,” http://www.unhcr.org/high-commis-
sioners-dialogue-on-protection-challenges-2017.html. 
 33 See UN General Assembly, “Transforming Our World: 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” para. 29, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/70/1&Lang=E, where the manifesto speaks of the posi-
tive contribution of refugees and migrants to “inclusive 
growth and sustainable development.”
 34 The UNHCR realized the mixed nature of migratory flows in 
2007 as it drew up “Refugee Protection and Mixed Migra-
tion: A 10-Point Plan of Action,” http://www.unhcr.org/
uk/protection/migration/4742a30b4/refugee-protection-
mixed-migration-10-point-plan-action.html, though the 
plan of action showed the bind of humanitarian thought. 
On this debate see, among others, Christoph Tometten, 
“Juridical Response to Mixed and Massive Population Flows,” 
Refugee Watch 39–40 (2012): 125–40, http://www.mcrg.
ac.in/rw%20files/RW39_40/11.pdf; Khadija Elmadmad, 
“Mixed Flows and the Protection of Migrants with Special 
Reference to Sub-Saharan Migrants,” Istituto Per GLI Studi 
Di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Working Paper 26, 2008, 
https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_26_2008.pdf.
 35 Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis 
Tsianos, Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 
Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto, 2006), 56.
 36 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes, 43.
 37 For a comprehensive discussion on the concept of auton-
omy of migration, see Stephan Scheel, “Autonomy of 
Migration Despite Its Securitisation? Facing the Terms 
and Conditions of Biometric Re-bordering,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013): 575–600; 
Scheel speaks of the interface of the principle of autonomy 
and government as embodied encounters, such as between 
migrants’ autonomous practices of movement and myr-
iad regulations, including biometric surveillance. See his 
“Studying Embodied Encounters: Autonomy of Migration 
beyond Its Romanticisation,” Postcolonial Studies 16, no. 3 
(2013): 279–88. 
 38 The IOM vision also carries evidence of such contradic-
tion. It states, “The Global Compact presents an histori-
cal opportunity for achieving a world in which migrants 
move as a matter of choice rather than necessity, through 
safe, orderly and regular channels, and in which migra-
tion is well governed and able to act as a positive force for 
individuals, societies and States. IOM envisions a global 
compact that will place the rights, needs, capacities and 
Volume 36 Refuge Number 1
86
contributions of migrants at its core, with a view to ensur-
ing their safety, dignity and human rights. Central to this 
vision are four core elements: (1) protecting the rights of 
migrants; (2) facilitating safe, orderly and regular migra-
tion; (3) reducing the incidence and impacts of forced 
and irregular migration; and (4) addressing mobility con-
sequences of natural and human-induced disasters.” IOM, 
“IOM Vision on the Global Compact on Migration,” April 
13, 2017, para. 2; also para. 10, https://www.iom.int/sites/
default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-vision-on-the-
global-compact-on-migration-13April2017.pdf.
Ranabir Samaddar is the Distinguished Chair in Migration 
and Forced Migration Studies, Calcutta Research Group, Kol-
kata, India. The author may be contacted at ranabir@mcrg 
.ac.in.
